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01-1127 Lockyer v. Andrade
Ruling Below (Andrade v. Attorney General of CA., 9 ,h Cir., 270 F.3d 743, 2001 U.S. App.
Lexis 23720, 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9423, 2001 DailyJournal DAR 11769)
The California Three-Strikes law, as applied to Andrade, who was sentenced to two
consecutive terms of 25 years to life for petty theft, was found to be unconstitutional on the
grounds that it was cruel and unusual punishment, as his sentence was grossly
disproportionate to his crimes.
Questions Presented: (1) Does California's Three-Strikes law violate the 8th Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when the sentence is 25 years to life for a
defendant whose third strike conviction was for petty theft with prior theft-related
convictions or when the crime is stealing golf clubs?
(2) Did the California courts make an "unreasonable application" of federal law within the
meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's habeas corpus provision, 28
U.S.C. @ 2254(d)(1), in its consideration of California's Three-Strikes law?
Leandro ANDRADE, Petitioner- Appellant
V.
ATTORNEY GENERAL of the State of California; Ernest B. ROE, Warden,
Respondents-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided November 2, 2001
PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
[Andrade was convicted of two counts of
petty theft for shoplifting $153.54 worth
of videotapes from K-Mart. Petty theft is
generally treated as a misdemeanor in
California, but because Andrade had
several prior convictions (all non-violent)
the counts were enhanced to felonies, and
then to third and fourth strikes under the
California Three Strikes and You're Out
Law. He was sentenced to life in prison
with no possibility of parole for 50 years.]
In this appeal from the denial of his
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
Andrade argues that his sentence violates
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.
[ ... I
We hold that the California Court of
Appeal unreasonably applied clearly
established United States Supreme Court
precedent when it held, on Andrade's
direct appeal, that his sentence did not
violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Our decision does not
invalidate California's Three Strikes law
generally. Rather, we conclude that it is
unconstitutional only as applied to
Andrade because it imposes a sentence
grossly disproportionate to his crimes.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. California's Three Strikes Law
The purpose of the [California Three
Strikes] law is to impose longer terms of
imprisonment on defendants with prior
qualifying felony convictions or "strikes."
16 P.3d at 179. Under the law, only
"serious" or "violent" felonies [. . .1
qualify as prior strikes. Cal. Penal Code §5
667(d)(1), 1170.12(b)(1). The "triggering"
(i.e., principal) offense, however, may be
any felony under California law. [... ]
Under the "second-strike" provision of
the Three Strikes law, when a defendant
with one prior strike is convicted of any
felony, the sentencing court must impose
a sentence twice as long as the sentence
the defendant would have otherwise
received. Cal. Penal Code 5 667(e)(1),
1170.12(c)(1); Cerwra, 16 P.3d at 177.
When a defendant with two prior strikes is
convicted of any felony, the "third-strike"
provision mandates a sentence of at least
25 years to life (i.e., an indeterminate life
sentence with eligibility for parole after
serving no fewer than 25 years). Cal. Penal
Code §5 667(e)(2)(A), 1170.12(c)(2)(A).
In addition to the fact that the triggering
felony need not be "serious" or "violent,"
several other features of California's Three
Strikes law combine to make it particularly
severe. * * * [(1) Defendants may
received two prior strikes from a
conviction on two offense in one judicial
proceeding; (2) prior strikes need only be
"serious" not "violent;" (3) prior strikes
may arise from convictions prior to the
law's enactment, in another jurisdiction, or
while a juvenile; (4) strikes stay on the
defendant's record indefinitelx (5)
consecutive sentences are imposed for
multiple felonies committed for the third
strike; (6) defendants sentenced to life are
not eligible for parole until serving a
mandatory minimum term.]
B. Facts And Procedural History
[Prior to his current convictions, Andrade
had been convicted of five non-violent
felonies and two misdemeanors in a
variety of jurisdicitions dating back to
1982. His current offenses would
normally be petty theft, a misdemeanor in
California. However, because of his prior
misdemeanor theft, Andrade was charged
with petty theft with a prior. This is a
"wobbler" offense, meaning that it can be
charged as either a misdemeanor or a
felony, at the discretion of the prosecutor.
The trial court may also review the charge
during sentencing.]
* * *
In Andrade's case, the prosecutor elected
to charge his two petty thefts with a prior
as felonies, thereby implicating the Three
Strikes law. Andrade's three 1983 burglary
convictions were charged as his first two
strikes. His petty thefts were charged as
his third and fourth strikes.
[The trial court found Andrade guilty of
two counts of petty theft and sentenced
him two to consecutive terms of 25 years
to life. He will not be eligible for parole
until 2046, after serving 50 years; he will
be 87 years old. The California Court of
Appeal affirmed his conviction. The
California Supreme Court denied his
petition for review.
II. JURISDICTION
[Although Andrade did not file his notice
of appeal until 50 days after the district
court entered judgment, instead of the 30
3
days prescribed by law, the court agreed
the motion for extension of time was the
functional equivalent of a notice of
appeal. The court discussed how it
distinguishes this case from a previous
contrary holding in Selph u Camd of City of
Los Angd, 593 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir.
1979), and examined the issue in light of
recent Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals decisions.]
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[The court reviewed de novo the district
court's decision to grant or deny a habeas
petition under the provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA"). Under AEDPA, only
state court decisions that are contrary to
federal law may be reversed. Such
decisions may be contrary to federal law if
(1) it fails to apply correct controlling
authority or (2) it incorrectly applies
controlling authority.]
IV. EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that there
"shall not be ... cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." At issue here is
whether this amendment proscribes a
sentence of 50 years to life for two
shoplifting offenses involving nine
videotapes worth a total of $ 153.54 by a
defendant with several previous
convictions for non-violent offenses. The
California Court of Appeal, in its 1997
decision affirming Andrade's conviction,
concluded that it did not.
The constitutionality of life sentences for
non-violent recidivists is controlled by
several decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court in the two decades prior to the state
court's decision. In Runrl u Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 100 S. Ct.
1133 (1980), the Court upheld a sentence
of life in prison with the possibility of
parole for a three-time non-violent felony
recidivist. Three years later, in Sd/em u
Hdn, 463 U.S. 277, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637, 103
S. Ct. 3001 (1983), the Court reversed a
sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for a seven-time non-
violent felony recidivist. Finally, in
Hamrdin u Mihigrn, 501 U.S. 957, 115 L.
Ed. 2d 836, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), a
decision without a majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and
two other justices, reconciled the Court's
prior decisions in Rwrd and Sd/em and
articulated a revised test. Under this test,
the "Eighth Amendment does not require
strict proportionality between crime and
sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme
sentences that are 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime." Hamrrin,
501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting Sac/e, 463 U.S. at 288, 303). Our
circuit and others regard Justice
Kennedy's test as" the rule of Hamrin"
because it is the "position taken by those
Members who concurred in the
judgement [sic] on the narrowest grounds
...." Unitel State u Bland, 961 F.2d 123,
128-29 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted) ["see also"
citation onitted.] [...]
A. Review of Supreme Court Case Law
Justice Kennedy's concurrence did not
challenge the central holding of Sdem that
a grossly disproportionate sentence of
imprisonment violates the Eighth
Amendment. Harrin, 501 U.S. at 1001
(citing Sc/em, 463 U.S. at 288, 303). Nor
did Justice Kennedy question the Sdem
majority's conclusion that Sderris sentence
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of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for uttering a no
account check was grossly
disproportionate, given the "'relatively
minor' "nature of Sdem's offenses. 501
U.S. at 1002 (quoting So/A 463 U.S. at
296-97). Rather, Justice Kennedy
emphasized several points also made by
the Sdemmajority. 501 U.S. at 998 (stating
that "close analysis of our decisions [in
Ruwlnr and Sdem] yields some common
principles that give content to the uses
and limits of proportionality review").
These principles include the following: (1)
courts should accord "substantial
deference" to legislative determinations of
appropriate punishments, Id at 998-99
(citing Sdem 463 U.S. at 290); (2) the
Eighth Amendment does not require that
legislatures adopt any particular
penological theory, 501 U.S. at 999, a
point implicit in the Sdem Court's
conclusion that legislatures are entitled to
"substantial deference;" (3) divergences in
theories of sentencing and the length of
prison terms are "inevitable" in our
federalist system, IJ at 999 (citing Sdiem,
463 U.S. at 291 n.17); (4) proportionality
reviews should be informed by objective
factors, 501 U.S. at 1000 (citing Sdem, 463
U.S. at 290); and (5) "the Eighth
Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between cnime and
sentence" but "rather, it forbids only
extreme sentences that are 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime," 501 U.S.
at 1001 (citing Sdem, 463 U.S. at 288, 303).
Relying on these "common principles,"
Justice Kennedy concluded that courts
need not examine the second and third
factors specified in Sdem --the
mtrajurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional
reviews --unless a "threshold comparison
of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality." 501 U.S. at 1005.
While Justice White in his Harmdin dissent
considered this "an abandonment of the
second and third factors set forth in
Sa/n," Id at 1020, Justice Kennedy argued
that it was consistent with the Sam
Court's "admonition that 'a reviewing
court rarely will be required to engage in
extended analysis to determine that a
sentence is not constitutionally
disproportionate, "'Id. at 1004 (citing
So/em 463 U.S. at 290 n.16).
The means by which Justice Kennedy
decided that Hamdin's sentence did not
violate the Eighth Amendment
demonstrates the conformity between his
proportionality analysis and that
articulated by the San Court. Rather than
emphasizing a different analytical
framework, Justice Kennedy based his
analysis on the more serious nature of
Harlin's offense. * * * Thus, in
concluding that Harrlin's sentence did
not raise an inference of gross
disproportionality, Justice Kennedy did
not suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that his
analysis would have led to a different
outcome in SCem Accordingly, we
conclude that Sdem remains good law
after Harrlin, recognizing that we need
not consider Sdemis second and third
factors if we conclude under the first
factor that a defendant's sentence does
not raise an inference of gross
disproportionality to the crime. Id. at 1005
[further citations omitted].
B. Application of Supreme Court Case
Law
Following the revised three-factor test, we
first compare Andrade's punishment to
his crimes. Because this comparison leads
to an "inference of gross
disproportionality," we then proceed to
compare Andrade's sentence to sentences
imposed for other crimes in California
and then to sentences imposed for similar
crimes in other jurisdictions.
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1. Comparison of Punishment and Crime
a. Harshness of the Penalty
Andrade was sentenced to two
consecutive indeterminate sentences of 25
years to life in prison. Because of a unique
feature of the Three Strikes law, the
sentencing judge had no discretion to
impose the sentences concurrently. Cal.
Penal Code 55 667(c)(6), 1170.12(a)(6);
Ingram, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264. Unlike
most sentences imposed under
California's sentencing laws, Andrade's
minimum three-strikes term may not be
reduced by credit for good behavior or
working while in prison. Cerwra, 16 P.3d
at 181. Andrade therefore must serve a
minimum of 50 years in prison before he
is eligible for parole.
The unavailability of parole for a half
century makes Andrade's sentence
substantially more severe than the life
sentence at issue in Runtrl. There,
Rummel was eligible for parole in as few
as 12 years. In contrast, Andrade must
serve more than four times the length of
Ruwrrl's sentence before he becomes
eligible for parole [citation omitted].
Indeed, Andrade's sentence is the
functional equivalent of the sentences at
issue in Sa&m and Hamrlin --life in prison
without the possibility of parole. A "life
sentence without parole is the second
most severe penalty permitted by law,"
Harrrelin, 501 U.S. at 1001, and is the same
sentence that the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional when imposed on a
seven-time felony recidivist in Sder.
Andrade was 37 years old at the time of
his sentencing and will be 87 years old
when he is first eligible for parole. The life
expectancy of a 37-year-old American
male is 77 years. National Center for
Health Statistics, Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, National Vital
Statics Reports at Table 2, Vol. 47, No. 28
(Dec. 13, 1999). It is thus more likely than
not that Andrade will spend the remainder
of his life in prison without ever
becoming eligible for parole.
b. Gravity of the Offense
As Harnrmlin makes clear, simply because a
sentence is harsh does not mean that it is
disproportionate to the crime. We
examine the punishment in light of the
gravity of the offense. We also recognize
that a "State is justified in punishing a
recidivist more severely than it punishes a
first offender." Sdem, 463 U.S. at 296. But
the enhanced punishment imposed for
the [present] offense 'is not to be viewed
as ... [an] additional penalty for the earlier
crimes, 'but instead as 'a stiffened penalty
for the latest crime, which is considered to
be an aggravated offense because a
repetitive one. "' Witte v United State, 515
U.S. 389, 400, 132 L. Ed. 2d 351, 115 S.
Ct. 2199 (1995) [further citations omitted].
[... ] Petty theft is similar in many respects
to the defendant's crime of "uttering a no
account check" in Saln Both "involve
neither violence nor [the] threat of
violence to any person "and a relatively
small amount of money. Id. at 296.
Additionally, both are easily distinguished
from the defendant's crime in Hamrin,
where Justice Kennedy emphasized the
serious and often violent consequences of
drug use and distribution and noted that
Hamlin possessed enough cocaine for
between 32,500 and 65,000 doses.
Hamrlin, 501 U.S. at 1002. Justice
Kennedy distinguished Hamelin's offense
from the "relatively minor, nonviolent
crime at issue in Sc&em" concluding that
Harmlin's crime was "as serious and
violent as the crime of felony murder
without specific intent to kill ...." Id. at
1002, 1004. Andrade's crimes did not pose
a "grave harm to society," Id. at 1002, and
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the nine videotapes he stole were
recovered by store personnel as he exited
the stores.
Moreover, petty theft is usually
prosecuted as a misdemeanor. By
classifying such conduct as a
misdemeanor, the California legislature
has indicated that petty theft is regarded
as a relatively rmior offense [... ]
It is significant that the core conduct for
which Andrade was sentenced is, in the
first instance, classified as a misdemeanor
rather than a felony. While the Supreme
Court frequently defers to legislative
judgments regarding the proper length of
imprisonment for felony offenses, it is less
clear that the same degree of deference is
appropriate when extreme sentences are
imposed for misdemeanor conduct.
[citations omitted]
Of course, Andrade was sentenced as a
recidivist, and the gravity of his offense
cannot be assessed independently of his
previous criminal conduct. According to
the State, Andrade's criminal record
warrants the enhanced punishment and
therefore justifies its severity. Not all
enhanced sentences imposed on repeat
offenders are constitutional, however, as
demonstrated by the Sdem Court's
decision to vacate the life sentence of a
seven-time felony recidivist.
California's Three Strikes law imposes a
25-year-to-life sentence on defendants
previously convicted of two or more
"serious" or "violent" felonies. Cal. Penal
Code 55 667(e)(2)(A), 1170.12(c)(2)(A).
Andrade's predicate "serious" felonies
were three counts of residential burglary
adjudicated in a single proceeding more
than a decade earlier. This contrasts with
the defendant in Runrl, who served time
in prison for his first felony before being
convicted and serving time for his second
felony --a fact the Court found significant.
Rwrl, 445 U.S. at 278.
Even if we consider Andrade's entire
criminal history record --five felonies, two
misdemeanors, and one parole violation --
it is still comparable, quantitatively and
qualitatively, to that of the defendant in
Sdem Both defendants had three burglary
convictions, although only Andrade was
convicted of all three in a single
proceeding. All of the offenses were non-
violent. Given that Andrade's sentence of
50 years to life is a sentence of life without
a realistic possibility of parole, his case is
most analogous to Sd/em
c. Inference of Gross Disproportionality
A threshold comparison of the harshness
of the penalty and the gravity of the
crimes leads to an inference that
Andrade's sentence was grossly
disproportionate. Andrade will likely serve
the remainder of his life in prison for
shoplifting nine videotapes.
This inference of disproportionality is not
dissipated by Andrade's prior criminal
record. His prior "strikes" were non-
violent burglaries, prosecuted in a single
judicial proceeding, more than a decade
before he was sentenced under the Three
Strikes law. His other offenses, although
not considered at sentencing, were also
non-violent. Moreover, due to a unique
quirk in California law, his recidivism was
double-counted by first enhancing his
misdemeanor petty theft offenses to
felonies and then enhancing them to third
and fourth strikes.
2. Intrajurisdictional Comparison
An intrajurisdictional comparison is only
required when a sentence presents an
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"inference of gross disproportionality."
Hamrlin, 501 U.S. at 1005 [... I
Where, as here, the harshness of the
sentence appears grossly disproportionate
to the gravity of the offense and the
culpability of the offender, we must assess
whether the disputed sentence is excessive
when compared to "sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. "
Sen, 463 U.S. at 292. See also Harlin,
501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
[further citations omitted]. [... ]
[The court found Andrade's sentence to
be grossly disproportionate because his
sentence is exceeded only by first
degree-murder a few violent crimes such
as some types of kidnapping, train
wrecking or derailing, and unlawful
explosions. Other violent crimes, such as
second-degree murder, manslaughter,
rape, or sexual assault, are punished
significantly less severely than Andrade.]
The State argues that, because Andrade is
a recidivist, we must compare his sentence
to those of other non-violent recidivists in
California. [... ]
Although we agree that comparisons to
sentences for other recidivists are relevant,
the problem with the State's argument is
that it attempts to justify the
constitutionally-suspect application of a
statute by pointing to other applications
of the same statute. We find this approach
less than convincing.
That said, Andrade's sentence is unusual
even when compared to other sentences
for non-violent recidivists under the
Three Strikes law. [... ]
Our intrajurisdictional comparison of
sentences in California supports the
conclusion that Andrade's sentence was
grossly disproportionate to his crimes and
therefore proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. [... ]
3. Interjurisdictional Comparison
[At least 40 states have some for of
recidivist sentencing statute.] Of
those jurisdictions with some form of
recidivist sentencing statute, the State
suggests only four where Andrade's
triggering offense (petty theft with a prior)
could qualify for recidivist sentencing:
Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas, and
Louisiana. Even in these four states,
however, Andrade could not receive a
sentence nearly as severe as he did under
California's Three Strikes law on the basis
of his two prior strikes for residential
burglary. If we also consider Andrade's
prior convictions not included in the
calculation of his sentence under
California's Three Strikes law --his 1982
misdemeanor theft offense and his two
federal convictions for transportation of
marijuana --only in Louisiana is it possible
for Andrade to receive a comparable
sentence. Even then, the sentence would
be vulnerable to a challenge under the
Louisiana state constitution.
The possibility that Andrade might have
received a comparable sentence in one
other jurisdiction does not render his
sentence constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. SeN 463 U.S. at 299-300
[citations omitted]. Indeed, that Andrade
could receive a comparable sentence in
only one other state --and, even then, only
if that state considered prior convictions
not necessary for application of
California's Three Strikes law --supports
our conclusion that Andrade's sentence
was grossly disproportionate to his crimes.
HarLin, 501 U.S. at 1005 ("The proper
role for comparative analysis of sentences,
then, is to validate an initial judgment that
8
a sentence is grossly disproportionate to a
crime.").
We thus conclude, following the revised
three-factor test articulated by Justice
Kennedy in Hanrdin, that: (1) Andrade's
punishment of 50 years to life raises an
inference of gross disproportionality when
compared to his two petty thefts of nine
videotapes worth $ 153.54, even in light of
his prior felony and misdemeanor
convictions; (2) Andrade's sentence is
substantially more severe than sentences
for most violent crimes in California and
is unusual even when compared to other
applications of California's Three Strikes
law; and (3) Andrade could not have
received such a severe sentence anywhere
else, with the possible exception of
Louisiana. Accordingly, we disagree with
the California Court of Appeal and
conclude that Andrade's sentence is so
grossly disproportionate to his crime that
it violates the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
C. Decision of the California Court of
Appeal
Of course, under AEDPA, mere
disagreement is not enough. We may grant
relief only if the state court's decision is
"contrary to, or involves an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
2254(d)(1).
[The court reviewed the state court's
analysis and found its decision was
irreconcilable with the Saem decision, and
thus in error.]
V. CONCLUSION
Our decision does not invalidate
California's Three Strikes law. Rather, our
holding is limited to the application of the
Three Strikes law to the unusual
circumstances of Andrade's case. [...
Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment
of the district court [with instructions on
remand to issue the writ of habeas corpus
if resentencing does not occur within 60
days.]
SNEED, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part:
[The dissent disagreed only with the
majority's holding that the punishment
violates the Eighth Amendment.
The dissent argued that the test in
Harndin favors upholding Andrade's
sentence, because (1) courts should grant
broad deference to the legislature in fixing
punishments for crimes, which in this case
was affirmed by a large portion of the
electorate; (2) no penological goal carries
more Constitutional weight than any
other, so rehabilitation is not to be
preferred over incapacitation, especially
when it is the will of the electorate; (3) it is
not for federal courts to determine the
appropriate length of sentences, as
experimentation with varied sentencing is
a benefit of the federal system; and (4)
review should be conducted in light of
objective standards, which are noticeably
lacking in comparing lengths of sentences
in terms of years.
The dissent found it persuasive that no
other federal court had overturned the
conviction of a habitual offender as being
grossly disproportional to the crime for
the purposes being cruel and unusual
punishment.
Because the appellant was a repeat
offender, and a rational basis exists for the
state's sentencing structure, the dissent
would uphold the conviction.]
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01-6978 Ewing v. California
(Note: Although the moot court will focus on the A ndrade case, the Court is also considering elements of the
Three Strikes law in Eing v dGonrni-- a distinct case raising related issues.)
Ruling Below (People v. Ewing, Cal.Ct. App., 2001 WL 1840666)
The court held that the trial court acted within the discretion given it by the Three Strikes
Law and that a sentence of 25 years to life for a defendant caught stealing golf clubs after
several prior convictions for non-violent crimes was not cruel and unusual punishment.
Questions Presented: (1) Did the trial court fail to exercise or abuse its discretion to strike
prior convictions in the sentencing of the defendant 25 years to life in prison for stealing
golf clubs?
(2)Is such a sentence in violation of the 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment?
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
V.
Gary Albert EWING, Defendant and Appellant
Court of Appeals
For the Second District, California
Decided April 25, 2001
COFFEE, Associate Justice:
FACTS
In March of 2000, an employee of the pro
golf shop at the El Segundo Golf Course
observed appellant enter the shop, look at
golf clubs for 10 to 15 minutes, and
purchase a small bucket of balls to use on
the driving range. Appellant asked for
directions to the driving range and walked
back to the golf clubs. There were other
customers in the shop during this time.
The employee observed that appellant was
"noticeably limping" when he walked out
of the shop and, instead of walking in the
direction of the driving range, he walked
toward the parking lot. Realizing that
appellant looked "totally out of place," the
employee called 911.
Officer Richard Haney of the El Segundo
Police Department arrived and saw
appellant walking stiff legged between two
parked vehicles. He saw appellant pull
three golf clubs out of his pants and
arrested him. The employee testified the
clubs were Calloway golf clubs priced at
$399 each, they had the shop's
identification number on them, appellant
had not paid for them, and he did not
have permission to take them out of the
store.
The Motion to Reduce the Wobbler
Offense to a Felony





appellant had previously been convicted in
1993 of first degree robbery and three
separate residential burglaries, all serious
or violent felonies under the Three Strikes
law.
At sentencing, defense counsel orally
moved the court to reduce the current
grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor
pursuant to section 17(b) and to strike "an
appropriate number" of his prior
convictions. His counsel observed that, of
his four prior serious felony convictions,
two were nonviolent, appellant was 38
years old, and his health problems would
minimize the chance of future criminal
activity (he was ill with AIDS and blind in
one eye). Defense counsel argued his
theft-related offenses were drug related
and he had not received assistance for his
drug problem. The prosecution countered
that appellant had suffered 10 convictions
and had repeatedly failed at probation and
parole.
[The court dismissed Ewing's argument
that the lack of an express ruling by the
trial court on the application of his prior
convictions to the current charges under
the Three Strikes law indicated a failure of
the court to exercise its discretion.]
Alternatively, appellant argues the court
abused its discretion in denying the
section 17(b) motion by focusing solely on
appellant's criminal history and failing to
consider other relevant factors [further
citations omitted]. We reject this
contention.
[The court found (1) that the appellant
waived his right to challenge the 17(b)
ruling on the abuse of discretion grounds;
(2) that the trial court was presumed to
have considered all relevant criteria unless
the record showed otherwise; and (3) that
the trial court acted well within its
discretionary powers to reduce a wobbler
to a misdemeanor.]
Refusal to Strike the Prior Convictions
Appellant next contends the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to strike
one or more of his prior serious felony
convictions. We disagree.
Trial courts have limited discretion under
section 1385 to strike prior conviction
allegations in Three Strikes cases. (People v
Suenor Court (Rawm) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497, 529-530.) The trial court must
consider "whether, in light of the nature
and circumstances of his present felonies
and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his
background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the
[Three Strikes sentencing] scheme's spirit,
in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously
been convicted of one or more serious
and/or violent felonies." (People u Willian
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) The trial
court should also consider the general
sentencing objectives under California
Rules of Court, rule 410. (Alvze, supra,
14 Cal.4th at p. 978.)
Trial court rulings on Ronrr motions are
reviewed under the deferential abuse of
discretion standard. (A l2e, spra, 14
Cal.4th at pp. 976-978.) Under that
standard, a defendant who seeks reversal
must demonstrate the trial court's decision
was irrational or arbitrary. It is not enough
to show that reasonable people might
disagree about whether to strike one or
more of the prior convictions. (Ibid; People
SMers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 309-
310.)
Here, the trial court's sentencing decision
was not irrational or arbitrary. Appellant
has a lengthy criminal record dating back
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to 1984, with numerous misdemeanor and
felony convictions. The record includes
convictions for theft, battery, possession
of a firearm, robbery, and burglary. Two
of his prior strike convictions were violent
and involved the use of a weapon.
Appellant's rehabilitative prospects are
bleak He has continuously been on either
probation or parole since 1988 and
cominitted the current offense after being
released for only nine months. The
probation report found no circumstances
in mitigation. Given appellant's prior
convictions, background, and
rehabilitative prospects, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that
appellant was within the spirit of the
Three Strikes law and denying his motion.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
We also reject appellant's contention that
his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of both the
federal and state constitutions. He argues
his sentence is grossly disproportionate to
the offense of "stealing golf clubs." We
disagree.
Under our state Constitution, the issue is
whether the 25-years-to-life sentence is so
disproportionate to the crime for which it
was imposed that it "shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental
notions of human dignity." (In re Lynch
(1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424; People v Dilan
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 441.) Under Lynh, three
factors are critical: (1) the nature of the
offense and offender, (2) the sentence
compared to sentences for more serious
offenses in California, and (3) the
sentence compared to sentences for the
same offense in other states. (Lynch, at pp.
425-427.)
Appellant's sentence is constitutional
under Lynh. As discussed above, the
sentence is reasonably proportional to the
offense and offender. The severity of the
sentence was properly affected by his
prior convictions under the Three Strikes
law, a general recidivist history, and dim
prospects for the future. Also, his
sentence conforms to sentences for repeat
offenders under the Three Strikes law and,
although he does not address the issue, it
is also constitutionally proportional to
sentences for repeat offenders in other
states. (People u Martinez (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509-1516.) Numerous
cases have held that severe sentences
under the Three Strikes law do not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the federal or state constitutions.
Cases upholding 25-years-to-life (or more)
sentences for arguably minor offenses
committed after two or three prior strike
convictions include Martine, stpra, People
u Goduin (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1084 and
People u Cooper (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 815.
Nor does his sentence violate the Eighth
Amendment. The United States Supreme
Court has "repeatedly upheld recidivism
statutes" against contentions that they
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
(Paree v Raley (1992) 506 U.S. 20, 27.) In
Runnwl v Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, for
example, the Supreme Court upheld the
mandatory life sentence, under a Texas
recidivist statute, of a defendant convicted
of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses
with two prior felony convictions
involving nonviolent petty thefts. The
court observed that the sentence under a
recidivist statute is "based not merely on
that person's most recent offense but also
on the propensities he has demonstrated
over a period of time during which he has
been convicted of and sentenced for other
crimes." (Id at p. 284.) Such a statute
serves the legitimate goal of deterring
repeat offenders" and of segregating the
recidivist "from the rest of society for an
extended period of time." (ILbid) Just as
there was no Eighth Amendment
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violation in the mandatory life sentence
imposed for the nonviolent petty offenses
in Rur4 by analogy appellant's 25-years-
to-life sentence is not cruel and unusual.
Appellant's sentence was justified because
of his recidivism.
Evidence of the Prior Convictions
[The court found without merit Ewing's
argument that the prosecution did not
provide enough evidence that he had been
convicted previously, despite the
production of a packet containing "a
certification letter from the Department
of Corrections, a copy of appellant's
chronological movement history, an
abstract of judgment from case No.
NA018343, a fingerprint card with
appellant's physical description and
identifying information, and a small
booking photograph of 'Ewing, G.,'
'J15228,' dated April 18, 1998. All of the
pages in the packet had appellant's name
on them, as well as the identical CDC No.
'J15228.1
The judgment is affirmed.
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The Supreme Court took up California's
defense of its three-strikes law Monday,
saying it will rule on whether it is cruel
and unusual punishment to send a
criminal to prison for 50 years for stealing
$153 worth of videotapes.
The case, to be heard in the fall, does not
threaten the state's authority to lock up
for life those who commit several violent
cnmes. However, the court could reject
the state's use of a minor theft or drug
possession as a "third strike" that triggers
a long prison term. It is the first time the
high court will rule on a direct challenge
to a three-strikes law.
California Atty. Gen. Bill Lockyer called
the justices' decision "welcome news."
Twice in recent months, the U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals has overturned
the convictions of repeat criminals who
were given a prison term of at least 25
years for a third strike that was a petty
theft.
A Supreme Court ruling will "provide
clarification to judges, prosecutors and
defense attorneys on how the U.S.
Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment applies to California's three-
strikes law," Lockyer said.
USC law professor Erwin Chemeninsky,
who was asked by the 9th Circuit to
represent the two defendants, said it is
cruel and unusual punishment to impose a
life term for a minor theft. "California is
the only state where a misdemeanor
shoplifting charge can be the basis for a
life prison term," Chemerinsky said.
California's voters approved the three-
strikes law in 1994 after the kidnapping
and murder of 12-year-old Polly Klaas by
Richard Allen Davis, a repeat criminal
who was on parole from an earlier
kidnapping.
Most states impose extra, longer prison
terms on repeat offenders, and 26 states
have a version of the three-strikes law.
But California's law is considered the most
severe because it can lead to a life
sentence for a criminal who has
committed nonviolent offenses, such as
shoplifting.
Among the nearly 7,000 California
inmates who are serving life terms under
the law, 331 are there for a third strike
that was a petty theft, according to the
California Department of Corrections. An
additional 603 were charged with a third
strike for drug possession.
The state's judges have consistently
rejected challenges to these stiff sentences
based on the 8th Amendment.
But in November, the 9th Circuit Court
overturned the 50-year sentence given to
Leandro Andrade, a heroin addict from
San Bernardino County.
In 1983, he was convicted for two home
burglaries. He was arrested later on
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suspicion of several thefts and convicted
of a federal charge for carrying a small
amount of marijuana.
Then in 1995, after the state law took
effect, he was stopped twice for
shoplifting. On Nov. 4, he walked into a
Kmart in Ontario, stuffed several
videotapes into his pants and walked out.
He was arrested in the parking lot and
charged with stealing $84.70 worth of
merchandise, but he was freed on bail.
Two weeks later, he tried again at a Kmart
in Montclair. He stuffed several
videotapes in his pants and walked out.
Again, he was stopped by store personnel
and charged with stealing merchandise,
this time worth $68.84.
A jury convicted him of the two petty
thefts. Normally, California law treats
such thefts as misdemeanors, punishable
by six months in jail.
Prosecutors cited his two prior burglary
convictions and, because of his record, the
new petty thefts were considered felonies.
They also made for the third and fourth
strikes against him. The judge gave
Andrade 25 years to life in prison for each
theft. Because Andrade was then 37 years
old, his first chance for release would
come in 2046, when he is 87.
The state courts rejected his appeals, but
he filed a writ of habeas corpus that
challenged his imprisonment as
unconstitutional.
In its 2-1 decision, the 9th Circuit agreed
and ruled that his sentence was "grossly
disproportionate" to his offense.
The decision turned on a 1991 Supreme
Court case, Harrdin vs. Michigan. In a 5-4
vote, the justices upheld a life sentence for
Ronald Harrrlin, a former Air Force
officer and honor guard at the funeral of
President Kennedy. Harndin found
himself in trouble by the mid- 1980s, when
he was stopped by police who found a
one-pound block of cocaine in his car
trunk.
Under a Michigan law, Haradin was
sentenced to life in prison. The high
court's ruling in the case carried a mixed
message. A punishment cannot be
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime,
the justices said, but they nonetheless
upheld Harndin's life sentence as not
excessive for his drug crime.
Recently, the Harndin case has emerged as
the key precedent in the dispute over
California's three-strikes law, and not
surprisingly, the two sides differ on what
it means. State prosecutors say the
decision shows that even extraordinarily
stiff sentences are constitutional. Defense
lawyers point to its statement that a
"grossly disproportionate" sentence
violates the 8th Amendment.
In citing the Handin case, the 9th
Circuit's Judge Richard Paez of Los
Angeles wrote: "Our decision does not
invalidate California's three-strikes law.
Rather, our holding is limited to the
application of the . . . law to the unusual
circumstances of Andrade's case. ... [His]
sentence of life in prison with no
possibility of parole for 50 years is grossly
disproportionate to his two misdemeanor
thefts of nine videotapes, even when we
consider his history of nonviolent
offenses."
Paez did not say what other cases might
be affected by the Andrade ruling.
In February, however, another 9th Circuit
panel went further and overturned the life
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sentences of two men who had
committed several violent offenses in the
past. Richard Napoleon Brown had five
felony convictions on his record,
including robbery and assault with a
deadly weapon, when he was arrested for
stealing a $25 car alarm from a Walgreen's
store in Long Beach. This third strike sent
him to prison for at least 25 years, a
sentence the 9th Circuit also called
"grossly disproportionate."
Lockyer's office wasted no time in asking
the Supreme Court to take up the issue
and to sweep aside the constitutional
challenges to the California law.
The justices voted to hear the case of
Lockyer vs. Andrade, 01-1127. They also
agreed to hear a similar case that has a
different legal posture.
Two years ago, Gary Ewing was seen
walking with an unusual stiff-legged limp
as he left the pro shop at the El Segundo
Golf Course. As it turned out, he had
three Calloway golf clubs in his pants leg--
clubs that sold for $399 each. He had nine
prior convictions on his record, and the
attempted theft of the golf clubs sent him
to prison for at least 25 years.
But unlike Andrade, Ewing's was a new
appeal to the Supreme Court, not a habeas
petition on behalf of a longtime inmate.
Congress has tightened the federal habeas
corpus law and made it harder for U.S.
judges to intervene in state cases.
By taking up Ewing vs. California, 01-
6978, the Supreme Court gave itself the
option of ruling that a third strike for a
petty theft is unconstitutional for current
and future cases, but not for prison
inmates who are challenging past
convictions.
Copyright © 2002 Los Angeles Times
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Drive to Keep Repeat Felons in Prison Gains in California
The New York Times
December 26, 1993
Jane Gross
When Mike Reynolds vowed a year and a
half ago to find a way to keep repeat
offenders locked up for life, it seemed just
a howl of pain by a grieving father whose
teen-age daughter had been shot in the
head at point-blank range by a man with a
long criminal record.
But Mr. Reynolds's personal crusade to
tighten sentencing for career criminals has
become a political juggernaut here in
California, the scene in recent weeks of
several high-profile crimes, including the
abduction and slaying of 12-year-old Polly
Klaas at the hands of a twice-convicted
kidnapper. Until Polly's body was found
early this month, few outside this Central
Valley city knew anything about the 1992
slaying of Kimber Reynolds, 18, who was
leaving a restaurant with a friend when a
man tried to steal her purse and instead
shot her with a .357 Magnum revolver.
Aimed at Chronic Criminals
And fewer still knew that her father, a
wedding photographer, had responded by
writing a ballot measure that would
double and triple sentences and limit
parole opportunities for chronic criminals
like the one who killed his daughter, who
dreamed of a career in fashion and was
buried in a silver lame prom dress of her
own design.
But in recent weeks Mr. Reynolds's ballot
measure has become a rallying cry.
Frightened by the spread of random
violence in their neighborhoods, struck by
how often those crimes are committed by
repeat offenders and frustrated by what
they consider legislative inaction,
California voters are signing petitions for
the Reynolds measure at the rate of 15,000
a day.
Patterned on a Washington State initiative,
although stricter in many ways, the
measure, known as Three Strikes and
You're Out, is expected to qualify easily
for next November's ballot and, if current
public opinion holds, win by a landslide.
And 30 other states are looking into such
initiatives, which experts say could be the
hot issue of next year's campaign, as term
limits were for a sour electorate in 1992.
The popularity of such measures can be
understood by skimming the morning
newspaper or watching the evening news.
Despite statistics that show a drop in
violent crime nationwide, each day offers
a roster of victims who have been set
upon in relatively safe places by assailants
with long criminal records.
That was the case with Uwe-Wilhelm
Rakebrand, a honeymooning German
tourist killed in a rental car as he left the
Miami airport. Or Luke Sheehan and his
wife, Mary, gunned down outside a Wal-
mart in Oklahoma. Or James Jordan, the
father of the basketball star Michael
Jordan, shot in the chest while napping in
his luxury sedan beside a road in North
Carolina.
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Slain on Weekend Visit
It was also the case with Polly, snatched
from her bedroom during a slumber party
in rural Petaluma while her mother slept
nearby. And Kimber, who was slain not
on the mean streets of Los Angeles, where
she was studying fashion design, but
during a weekend visit here to be a
bridesmaid in a friend's wedding.
"What these crimes have done is show
people that you can do all the right things
and it doesn't matter," Mr. Reynolds said.
"You can lock your door, stay in the right
neighborhoods. But when you come up
against one of these creeps, the rules don't
matter. They're hunting you."
"When bad guys are killing bad guys,
that's one thing," he added. "But when
they start killing regular people, that's
where you draw a line in the sand. That's
what's driving people crazy."
From Trickle to Tidal Wave
That moment of collective horror came
here in California with the killing of Polly
Klaas, a case that riveted the nation for
months and turned a trickle of support for
Mr. Reynolds's initiative into a tidal wave.
Until then, Mr. Reynolds's campaign was a
relatively lonely one. On a shoestring
budget -- the money he and his wife,
Sharon, were saving for a mountain cabin
-- a small group of volunteers had
gathered 35,000 signatures, less than a
tenth of what was needed to put the
measure on the state ballot.
Around Thanksgiving, Mr. Reynolds was
invited to appear on a San Francisco talk
radio show, which inspired about 40,000
people in the Bay Area to sign petitions.
But still, the measure lagged far behind
the 385,000 signatures needed to put it
before the voters.
Then, on the first weekend in December,
Pollys body was found at an abandoned
lumber mill. A San Francisco radio
station, KGO-AM, suggested that
listeners vent their grief and frustration by
calling Mr. Reynolds and offering help in
his campaign.
By Monday morning, the voice mail
system in the Three Strikes and You're
Out storefront headquarters had crashed
under the onslaught of calls. Within a few
weeks, more than 300,000 signatures were
gathered. And these days, the letter carrier
staggers into the campaign office bowed
under the weight of his mail bag.
Angry Letter -Writers
The mail is angry, more punitive than the
measure itself, which mandates double the
usual sentence for a second serious felony
and triple the usual sentence or 25 years to
life, whichever is longer, for a third. By
contrast, the Washington State measure,
which passed last fall with 76 percent of
the vote, does not enhance sentences until
the third felony.
One typical letter writer was not satisfied.
"What is needed is three strikes and you're
dead," he said. "We can't afford to
warehouse this load of human debris!"
Unlike the Washington State initiative, the
California measure also restricts time off
for good behavior so that a felon must
serve 80 percent of any sentence rather
than half, as is often the case now. It also
includes violent crimes committed by
juveniles 16 years and older, which the
Washington measure does not.
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But repeat felons deserve worse than that,
the volunteers at the Three Strikes
headquarters said, echoing the letter
writers. "I'm for stricter things, like no
conjugal visits and shut down the prison
libraries," said Carl Lastella, a retired
banker.
Supporters of Mr. Reynolds's measure,
including Gov. Pete Wilson and the State
Attorney General, Dan Lundgren, both
Republicans, are confident that it will have
a sweeping effect if it is passed. But that is
impossible to judge at this point.
No Estimate of Costs
In Washington, 40 to 70 felons a year
were expected to meet the criteria of that
state's initiative, corrections officials
projected, but none have been charged
under the statute in its first month. No
similar projections have been made in
California, although there is widespread
agreement that more people would be
affected because of the stringency of the
measure and the size of the criminal
population here.
Nor has anyone predicted how much the
measure would cost if it went into effect, a
calculation normally made after an
initiative has qualified for the ballot. It is
assumed that extending the sentences of
so many felons would cost the state
billions of dollars in increased prison
costs, while saving cities and counties
some money because there would be
fewer repeat prosecutions.
Measures like the one in Washington and
the one proposed here in California are
expected to be more effective than the so-
called habitual offender laws on the books
in 17 states because they are broader and
their application is mandatory. The 17
state laws, by contrast, generally give
prosecutors and judges wide discretion
about whether to charge felons as habitual
offenders, and tend to be narrower about
which criminals qualify for the longer
sentences.
There is broad consensus among
criminologists that a small percentage of
repeat offenders are responsible for the
vast majority of violent crime. But experts
are divided about whether targeting repeat
offenders for life sentences is an effective
remedy.
William J. Bennett, the former Secretary
of Education who is now the director of
Empower America, a conservative
advocacy group, said such measures are a
worthy way to reduce the "frustration
level of Americans who see people
engaging in violent acts and not doing
their time."
A similar view is held by Joseph
McNamara, the former police chief in San
Jose, who is known for his generally
liberal views about law-enforcement
issues. Mr. McNamara said that he doubts
the measure's effectiveness. Nevertheless,
he said, its passage would "signal a change
in the national philosophy," and "show
that our society does in fact condemn
violence."
'Expensive Old-Age Homes'
But opponents say the measure, however
satisfying to frustrated voters, is bad
public policy because it would crowd the
prison system with aging felons without
having much impact on the rate of violent
crime.
"It'll stop a few guys, and that could add
up to big numbers in California, but
mainly it will just create the most
expensive old-age homes in the world,"
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said Peter Greenwood, the acting director
of the criminal justice program at the
Rand Corporation, a Southern California
research center.
But stopping a few guys would be enough
for Mr. Reynolds, who said his campaign
for new sentencing standards is what has
kept him sane since that summer evening
a year and a half ago, when the youngest
of his three children joined her two
brothers in a softball game and then went
out for coffee and cake with a friend.
As the couple left the Daily Planet
restaurant at 10:40 P.M., two young men
on stolen motorcycles wheeled up to the
curb. One of them grabbed Kimber's
purse. When she struggled, the assailant
stuck the barrel of his gun in her ear and
pulled the trigger. She was unconscious
before she hit the pavement, and died 26
hours later.
Shortly after Kimber's death, Mr.
Reynolds went on the radio here, begging
for a witness or an informer to help find
his daughter's killer. A friend of the
gunman did just that, leading the police to
25-year-old Joe Davis, a methampetamine
user who had been convicted and jailed
repeatedly for armed robbery, auto theft
and drug use.
Nine Years for Accomplice
Mr. Davis died in a gun battle with the
police. His accomplice, Douglas Walker,
27, also a drug user with a long criminal
record, pleaded guilty to armed robbery
and accessory to murder. He was
sentenced to nine years in prison. Under
current law, he will serve half that time.
Mr. Reynolds said that he is haunted by
feelings that he was not able to protect
Kimber in the final months and minutes
of her life.
Once she called him from Los Angeles
because her car would not start, and he
was struck by the realization that "there
comes a time you can't be there for a
child." He later bought her a cellular
telephone so she could call for help in
case of a highway emergency. But the
phone was stolen.
And these were but precursors to Mr.
Reynolds's ultimate helplessness. "You
never stop reliving the last moment's of
your child's life and wondering what you
could have done to prevent it," he said.
"If I was standing there with a gun I don't
think I could have stopped hin But I
might have shot him before he got down
the street."







I don't know much about Dr. Ira Gore Jr.
What I do know comes courtesy of the
U.S. Supreme Court: He used to drive a
BMW, he sued when he learned that the
automaker repainted his new car before
selling it to him, and his lawyer persuaded
a jury to award him $4 million in punitive
damages. I also don't know how much
help Gore has ever given to homeless
people or heroin addicts. But I'm sure he
would be glad to know that his Alabama
case might help free some of California's
somest pnsoners.
This happy occasion comes courtesy of
California's "three strikes" law. That's the
one, now mimicked widely, that puts
people in prison for 25 years to life once
they've pulled off a hat trick of crime.
Problem is, while the law was aimed at
taking our most dangerous and deadly off
the streets, it's also apt to punish society's
most poor and pathetic.
Consider a sample of those sentenced to
25 years to life: Leandro Andrade, a
heroin addict who stole nine videotapes
from Kmart. Gary Ewing, an AIDS
patient who stole three golf clubs. (The
U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari
in both cases.) Earnest Bray Jr., who stole
three videotapes from a shopping mall.
Richard Brown, who stole a steering-
wheel alarm from a drugstore. (The 9th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
the sentence in both cases.) And then
there's Michael Riggs, a man whom the
California Court of Appeal described as
"motivated by homelessness and hunger"
when he stole a bottle of vitamins. (The
high court denied cert in 1999.)
The Supreme Court agreed to review
Eving u Gdfornma (the golf clubs) and
LodJer v Andrade (the nine videotapes)
next term. And although Dr. Gore lost his
own case before the Court six years ago,
the result in the three-strikes cases should
make him a decent consolation prize.
THE PAINT JOB
In Gore's case, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided to get tough -- on juries. They
thought that juries had gotten too tough
on corporations, exacting from them what
the Court saw as overly punitive damages.
The undisclosed paint job in BMW of
North A nlm*ca v Gore cost the carmaker
$601.37. An Alabama jury found in Gore's
favor and assessed "actual" damages of
$4,000 (presumably the amount the car
lost in value as a result of being
repainted). And then it hit BMW with $4
million in punitives, which the Alabama
Supreme Court later reduced to $2
million.
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote,
reversed and remanded the punitives
award. (In the end, BMW had to pay
$50,000 in punitives.) But that's not the
interesting part of the story. What's
interesting is how the justices split on the
issue, the reasoning they used, and how
the case might come back to help the
three-strikes inmates in California.
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Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the
majority decision, joined by Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, David Souter and Stephen
Breyer. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Antonin Scalia wrote dissents, joined
respectively by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas.
All three of the most conservative justices
-- Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas -- voted
in favor of the high punitives. And three
of the liberals -- Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer -- voted against them. They had
their reasons, of course. The conservatives
had good conservative principles,
asserting that the majority was making up
new substantive rights under the due
process clause and impermissibly
curtailing states' rights. The liberals had
good liberal reasons, asserting that their
opinion ensured procedural due process
and limited the ability of states to burden
interstate commerce.
More interesting is how Ginsburg voted.
She acted as most people might expect a
liberal to act, siding with the individual
against the corporation. She argued that a
state jury could consider similar acts by a
defendant even if they had occurred out
of state. And that there is no bright line to
determine when awards are excessive.
And that the case was idiosyncratic and
did not require the Court's attention.
As for the "moderates" -- O'Connor and
Kennedy -- they apparently didn't think
that $2 million for failure to disclose a
paint job was very moderate.
THAT'S EXCESSIVE TOO
Why bother marching through all this (a
case about civil punitive damages that's
based on the due process clause of the
14th Amendment) to make a point about
two challenges to a three-strikes law (cases
that address criminal sentencing based on
the Eighth Amendment's guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment)?
Because, when it comes to punishment,
the Court should try to be consistent --
even across the line dividing criminal law
from civil law and the line dividing the
Eighth Amendment from the due process
clause. This isn't just my opinion; it's the
Court's.
In Gore, Stevens made multiple references
to the law of criminal sentencing. He cited
Sakm u Helm (1983) for the proposition
that "[t]he principle that punishment
should fit the crime 'is deeply rooted and
frequently repeated in common law
jurisprudence."' He also referred to
criminal statutes of Alabama, California,
Illinois, New York and Texas. Similarly,
Scalia in his dissent referred to the manner
in which "criminal sentences can be
computed."
Also, look at the scheme that Stevens
devised in Gore to determine when
punitive damages are excessive. The
Court, he wrote, must look at the "degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct," at the "ratio [between] the
actual harm inflicted" and the punitives
assessed, and at "sanctions for comparable
misconduct" in either the civil or criminal
realm. Now, look at the standards that the
Court laid out in Sdlem for determining
when a criminal sentence is excessive. The
majority wrote that an analysis of whether
a sentence is cruel and unusual should
include "(i) the gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty, (ii) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions."
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The Gow and Sdem tests are very similar.
Both look at how bad the underlying
conduct was, how that compares to the
penalty, and whether the penalty is similar
to penalties for similar actions. Though
the analysis of punitive damages takes
place under the due process clause, and
the analysis of criminal sentences takes
place under the Eighth Amendment, the
tests are functionally equivalent.
(The Supreme Court pulled back a bit
from its Sdem holding in its 1991 decision
Hanrrlin u MiAbgn While Sdem is
somewhat in limbo now, the Court will no
doubt try to clarify its staying power in the
three-strikes cases.)
STAYING THE SAME
So what happens now when the justices
try to decide the new California cases in
light of the Goe precedent? Here's where
consistency gets important -- and where
most of the justices should come out
where you would expect. The
conservatives will no doubt be consistent
by favoring limitless punitives and years of
imprisonment. And so will the three
liberals in the BMW majority by favoring
limits on both types of punishment.
Then there are Kennedy and O'Connor,
who are often accused of knowing a legal
violation only when their unpredictable
eyes see one. They seem bound for
consistency this time. In Gome, they voted
in favor of limiting civil penalties. And in
Harmin, they voted in favor of the
principle of limiting criminal sentences.
They didn't actually limit the sentence in
that case because the defendant was
convicted of possessing enough cocaine
for tens of thousands of doses. For less
dangerous offenders -- like those in the
three-strikes cases -- they're likely to
follow through with the constitutional rule
they've already supported.
That leaves Ginsburg. If she's consistent
with her reasoning and conclusion in Gore,
she'll find herself with the conservatives
again, opposing limits on excessive
punishment. Let's hope the justice looks
elsewhere for personal precedent. In the
1999 three-strikes case of the hungry,
homeless man who stole vitamins,
Ginsburg joined Stevens' published
opinion that denied cert but that also
expressed doubt about the
constitutionality of how California applies
its three-strikes law to petty crimes.
So the Court is likely to free these latter-
day Jean Valjeans. That's good news for
the prisoners. And it's good news for
consistency. The good Dr. Gore might
even agree that it's worth $3,950,000.
Copyright @ 2002 Law.com
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Perhaps a Court Ruling in a 'Three Strikes' Case Will Lead to Reform of the
Draconian Law
The Orange County Register
November 11, 2001
Erwin Chemerinsky
Punishing a person with a life sentence for
a trivial offense is unconstitutional and
inhumane. Yet, it occurs all the time in
California as the "three strikes" law is
applied to people who never have
committed a violent crime and whose last
offense can be as minor as petty theft.
Recently, the California Court of Appeal
upheld a sentence of 25 to life in prison
for stealing a few cookies.
In earlier cases, such sentences were
upheld as to a person whose third strike
was stealing a slice of pizza and as to a
homeless person who stole a bottle of
vitamins. Twice in the last year, I have
represented individuals on appeal who
were sentenced to ridiculously long
sentences for very minor crimes.
One case involved a homeless man,
Stanley Durden, who stole an umbrella
and two bottles of liquor from a
supermarket on a cold, rainy night. He
never had committed any violent crime.
Nonetheless, the trial court imposed a
sentence of 25 years to life in prison.
The California Court of Appeal upheld
the sentence and the Califomia Supreme
Court denied review. I represented the
man in seeking review by the United
States Supreme Court, but unfortunately it
was denied and he is in prison for the next
quarter of a century for shoplifting.
More recently, I represented Leandro
Andrade in the federal court of appeals.
Andrade was challenging a sentence of 50
years to life in prison for stealing $153
worth of videotapes from a department
store. He never had been convicted of any
violent crime. He committed three
burglaries on the same day in 1986 and
served a prison sentence for these crimes.
He also had a marijuana conviction that
was not considered as a prior strike. In
1996, he was caught twice within a week
stealing videotapes from Kmart
department stores. Both times he was
seen doing this on store cameras and the
tapes were confiscated; their total value
was $153. Under California law, stealing
less than $400 is a misdemeanor offense,
"petty theft," that carries a sentence of no
more than six months in prison.
The maximum sentence for two counts of
petty theft is a year in prison. But
California also has a law that says that the
same offense becomes a felony called
"petty theft with a prior" if the individual
has a prior felony conviction. The state
thus "double counts" the prior conviction.
First, it is used to convert a misdemeanor
into a felony. Then the enhanced felony is
used as a third strike. The judge in
Andrade's case imposed two sentences of
25 years to life to run consecutively, or 50
years to life altogether. Only first degree
murder and a few other violent crimes in
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California are punishable by a sentence of
50 years to life.
Durden and Andrade are not atypical.
According to California Bureau of Prison
statistics about 350 people are serving
sentences of 25 years to life in prison, or
more, when their third strike was petty
theft. There are people who are serving 25
to life when their third strike was
trespassing, or possessing a small amount
of drugs, or getting into a fight.
What can and should be done about this?
First, courts should find that such
sentences are cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
For at least a century, the Supreme Court
has held that grossly disproportionate
sentences are "cruel and unusual
punishment" in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Surely, putting a person in
prison for 50 years to life for stealing $153
worth of videotapes is cruel and unusual
punishment. On Nov. 2, for the first time
a court found that the three strikes law as
applied constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
The Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, ruled
that the sentence imposed on Leandro
Andrade violates the Eighth Amendment.
The United States Court of Appeals wrote
a very careful and very narrow opinion
declaring only that Andrade's sentence
was unconstitutional; the court did not
invalidate the three strikes law or indicate
how other sentences should be treated.
The Ninth Circuit's decision will inspire a
flurry of challenges by prisoners who have
been given very long sentences for trivial
offenses. The federal courts should follow
the court's reasoning in the Andrade case
and hold that it is unconstitutional to
impose a sentence of 25 years to life, or
more, when the third strike is petty theft,
or other minor non-violent conduct.
Second, California Attorney General Bill
Lockyer should change his office's policy
of defending such sentences on appeal.
Lockyer's office is responsible for criminal
appeals in the state. Fis oath of office
obligates him to follow the Constitution
and he could decide not to defend such
long sentences for petty offenses.
Frankly, I cannot understand why Lockyer
wants to fight to keep a person in prison
for 50 years who never has committed a
violent crime and whose last offense was
stealing $153 worth of videotapes.
Nothing in the law requires that Lockyer
defend sentences that he believes to be
unconstitutional; indeed, his constitutional
duty is not to defend such punishments.
Finally, the California Legislature should
act to amend the three-strikes law so that
it is not used to put people in prison for
long periods of time for minor non-
violent offenses. The three strikes law was
intended to take violent criminals off the
streets for a very long time.
There is no indication that the Legislature,
which enacted it, or the voters, who
ratified it by initiative, ever wanted it to
extend to non-violent crimes. It is
irrational to impose such sentences; the
costs of incarceration vastly outweigh the
benefits to society in, at best, preventing
some future instances of petty theft.
Amending the three-strikes law so that it
applies only to those who have committed
violent crimes would save the state's
taxpayers a large amount of money. The
issue is not whether to continue the three-
strikes law. Rather, it is whether it makes
any sense to put a person who never has
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committed a violent crime in prison for 50
years for stealing $153 worth of video
tapes.
This seems a sentence from another
country, in another century; it is inhumane
and indecent. Through the courts, the
California attorney general and the
Legislature relief should be given to those
serving long sentences for minor crimes.
The law must be changed so that no
longer are people put in prison for life for
minor cnmes.
Mr. Chemerinsky is a professor of
constitutional law and political science at
USC.
Copyright © 2002 The Orange County
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The Missing Piece in the Three-Strikes Puzzle
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The Honorable Clay M. Smith
In 1994, both the legislature and the
electorate enacted substantially identical
statutory schemes which were intended to
respond to the human misery and
economic loss caused by habitual criminal
offenders. See Penal Code 5 667(b)-(i) (the
legislative version) and Penal Code §
1170.12 (the initiative version). These
statutory provisions, commonly known as
the "Three Strikes law," have been a
source of increasing public debate since
their initial proposal. In general,
proponents of the law perceive it to be a
measured and justifiable means of
reducing recidivism and its effects.
Conversely, opponents see the law as
unnecessarily and unfairly draconian.
Regrettably, however, this debate almost
invariably omits what may be the most
vital piece of the three-strikes puzzle: the
power of the sentencing court to "strike
prior felony conviction allegations in
furtherance of justice ...." People v.
Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.App.4
superth 497, 530 (1996).
An overview of the statute is helpful.
Simply stated, the Three Strikes law
categorizes a number of criminal offenses
as "serious" (Penal Code 5 1192.7(c)) and
"violent" (Penal Code § 667.5(c)). The two
categories are similar, but not identical,
and include such crimes as murder, rape
and first- degree burglary. A conviction
for a first serious or violent felony (i.e., a
"strike") is punishable by the sentence
nominally prescribed for such offense. A
subsequent conviction for any felony,
regardless of whether or not it is
categorized as serious or violent, where
the defendant has one prior strike, is
punishable by "twice the term otherwise
provided as punishment for the current
felony conviction." Penal Code 5
667(e)(1). A conviction for any
subsequent felony, where the defendant
has two prior strikes, results in a
minimum sentence of 25 years to life
imprisonment. Penal Code § 667(e)(2)(A).
See People v. Superior Court (Romero),
supra, 13 Cal.App.4 superth at 505-06.
The bone of contention in the public
debate is often that the third felony
conviction need not be serious or violent;
any felony conviction will trigger the
third-strike sentence. Thus, for example, a
defendant with two strike priors (i.e., two
prior convictions for serious or violent
felonies) who is subsequently convicted of
a relatively low-grade felony, such as petty
theft with a prior theft conviction or
possession of a small quantity of drugs for
personal use, is subject to a minimum 25
years to life sentence.
In recent months, the level of public
discourse pertaining to the Three Strikes
law has intensified and it appears that
those advocating a significant change in
the law may be gathering momentum.
This momentum has been fueled by at
least three factors.
First, critics of the Three Strikes law have
identified and brought to public attention
a growing number of cases in which a
relatively minor felony conviction has
been the triggering event for a very
lengthy sentence. For example, in a recent
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article, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
described a case in which his client was
given a sentence of 25 years to life in
prison for stealing "an umbrella and two
bottles of liquor worth $43 from a
supermarket on a cold, rainy night."
Chemerinsky, "Behind Bars," Los Angeles
Daily Journal, November 16, 2001, at 6.
Professor Chemerinsky's assertion is, of
course, an oversimplification. A more fair
characterization is that his client, like all
incarcerated third-strike defendants, was
punished not for the third felony alone,
but rather for continuing to engage in
felonious conduct after two or more prior
convictions for serious or violent crimes.
In any event, Professor Chemerinsky and
other advocates for change are making a
strong case that the Three Strikes law has
resulted in some unjustifiably long
sentences.
Earlier this year, Justice Souter, in a
dissent from the denial of a petition for
certioran in a case which would have
presented an Eighth Amendment
challenge to the Three Strikes law, stated
that "some 319 California prisoners are
now serving sentences of 25 years to life
for what would otherwise be
misdemeanor theft under the California
scheme." Durden v. California, 531 U.S.
1184-85 (2001). Although this fact alone
makes the Three Strikes law neither
unwise nor unconstitutional, it does
demonstrate that the law is being regularly
imposed in cases in which the triggering
offense would under other circumstances
constitute a misdemeanor punishable by
not more than six months.
Second, the Ninth Circuit recently struck
down a third-strike sentence as violative
of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. In
Andrade v. Attorney General, 2001 U.S.
App.Lexis 23720 (9 superth Cir. 2001), the
court held that a 50 year to life sentence
imposed upon a defendant whose
triggering felony conviction was petty
theft with a prior theft conviction was "so
grossly disproportionate to his crime that
it violate [d] the Eight Amendment to the
United States Constitution." Id. at 61. In
that case, the defendant's prior criminal
conduct included three residential
burglaries, transportation of marijuana,
escape from federal prison, and petty
theft; in all, five prior felonies and two
misdemeanors. Although it may seem that
Mr. Andrade was the type of career
criminal for which the law was intended, a
majority of the Ninth Circuit panel was
persuaded that the imposition of a three-
strikes sentence was unconstitutional. The
Andrade case may bolster the critics'
contention that many three-strike
sentences are not just long, they are
unconstitutionally long.
Third, at least four justices of the United
States Supreme Court have opined that
the application of the Three Strikes law in
cases in which the triggering conviction is
petty theft with a prior theft conviction
"raises a serious question" under the Eight
Amendment. Riggs v. California, 525 U.S.
1114 (1999). Although this denial of a
petition for certiorari did not constitute a
ruling on the merits, it does signal that at
least a significant plurality of the justices
have constitutional reservations regarding
the Three Strikes law.
As the debate intensifies, the body politic
will ultimately make a judgment about the
Three Strikes law. The legislature, or the
voters via the initiative process, may
determine to amend the law, perhaps to
require that the third felony conviction
must also be a serious or violent felony.
Conversely, our collective judgment may
be that the law is appropriately structured
and that the positive aspects of its
consequences outweigh the negative.
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Remarkably, to date the debate has
virtually omitted a crucial factor--the
power of a sentencing court to apply the
Three Strikes law in a manner which
avoids an unfairly harsh or even
unconstitutional result. In People v.
Romero, supra, 13 Cal.App.4 superth 497,
the California Supreme Court held that a
sentencing judge has the authority to
disregard a prior strike for purposes of
sentencing. This principle entrusts to the
sound discretion of a trial judge the power
to sentence a third-strike defendant as if
he or she had one or even no prior strikes.
Of course, this discretion is not
unfettered. A trial judge may only exercise
this power upon a determination that to
do so would be in the interests of justice.
Such a determination requires a
comprehensive analysis of the defendant's
criminal history, background, character,
and other relevant information and a
finding, based on supporting factors,
which must be articulated for the record,
that the defendant "may be deemed
outside the schemes's spirit, in whole or in
part, and hence should be treated as
though he had not previously been
convicted of one or more serious and/or
violent felonies." People v. Williams, 17
Cal.App.4 superth 148, 161 (1998). See
also, People v. Strong, 87 Cal.App.4
superth 328, 335 (2001), hearing denied,
2001 Cal.LEXIS 3966.
As a neutral observer of this debate, I
suggest that the Romero rule should be
brought to the forefront of the discourse
over the future of the Three Strikes law.
To those who support the preservation of
the current structure of the law, Romero
may be an effective rebuttal to the call for
change. After all, Romero, at least in
theory, provides a clear and existing legal
basis for a trial court to avoid an unfairly
harsh sentencing result or, as was found
to be the case in Andrade, one which
violates the Eight Amendment.
At the same time, to those who advocate a
change in the law, the underlying concept
of Romero may represent the seed of a
more appropriate and easily achievable
remedy. In other words, rather than
amending the law to eliminate the
possibility of imposing a third-strike
sentence following a triggering conviction
for a non-senous or violent felony, an
amendment codifying and perhaps
relaxing the principles of Romero and its
progeny would encourage the exercise of
such discretion in appropriate cases while
preserving for trial courts the ability to
impose a third-strike sentence following
conviction for a non-senious or violent
felony when the totality of the
circumstances so dictate.
As the debate continues, both sides and
particularly the decision-making body,
must be aware of the impact of Romero
and its progeny. To date, the following
question has not been asked, but it must
be: Can Romero (or perhaps a refinement
thereof) adequately address the concerns
of both sides? Stated another way, can
Romero be adapted to prevent future
Andrade results while at the same time
preserving the power of trial courts to
impose a third-strike sentence where
deserved, even though the triggering
felony conviction, standing alone, is
neither serious nor violent? Unless these
questions are adequately considered, a
fully informed decision on the future of
the Three Strikes law is not possible.
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Even in his wildest dreams, Leandro
Andrade probably never imagined the
videotapes, valued at $153, he stole from
two K-Mart stores would garner him a 50-
year-to-life prison sentence. Andrade, a
37-year-old heroin addict, is one of the
many California criminals who were given
life sentences which resulted from non-
violent, low-level felony convictions.
Although Andrade received this sentence
under California's Three Strikes Law, his
case was monumentally different from
other Three Strikes cases because it was
declared unconstitutional by the 9th US
Circuit Court of Appeals. The court
concluded that Andrade's life sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment banning
cruel and unusual punishment. In its first
decision against the Three Strikes Law,
the appelate court has potentially opened
the door for legal challenges by many
other California prison inmates also
serving time under this rigid measure --
especially since more than half of the third
strike cases as of march 2001 involved
non-violent offenses.
Spawned by the brutal and highly
publicized murders of two young girls and
the growing demand to "get tough on
crime," the Three Strikes law, passed in
California in 1994, requires that offenders
convicted of certain crimes who commit
furhter felony offenses serve fixed
mnumum prison terms. Any adult who
has two or more prior serious or violent
felony convictions and is subsequently
convicted of any new felony faces life in
prison, and any adult who has one prior
serious or violent felony conviction and is
convicted of another felony of any
magnitude will face a sentence that is
twice that normally prescribed.
"Strikes" are "violent" and "serious"
felonies and include: murder, attempted
murder, rape, arson, robbery, kidnapping,
and any felony in which the perpetrator
personally inflicts great bodily injury on
any person. For example, residential
burglary of an unoccupied house is
considered a strike. There is no statute of
limitations on strikes -- any violent or
serious felony conviction, even if it was
received 30 or 50 years ago, is still
considered a strike for purposes of this
sentencing scheme. Even qualifying
convictions incurred while a person was a
juvenile can be considered strikes when he
or she reaches adulthood.
While half of the states in the US have
Three Strikes laws, only California and
five other states (Georgia, South Carolina,
Nevada, Washington, and Florida) have
been applying this directive with
jurisprudential force. California, like many
other states, is taking an aggressive stance
toward violent, habitual criminals by
initiating this law which was initially
designed to remove violent criminals from
the streets. It is becoming more evident,
however, that this law is not as efficacious
as its supporters assert. Research has
shown the Three Strikes law is
inconsistently applied, costly, and targets
more non-violent, low-level felons than
violent career criminals, resulting in life
sentences for offenses that would
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otherwise be billed as short-term county
jail time.
One of the key issues surrounding the
three strikes measure is its overall impact
on crime. Ex-Attorney General Dan
Lungren, one of the most ardent
supporters of this strict measure, states,
"There is just no way to ignore the
positive impact of the Three Strikes Law.
California's drop in crime is
outperforming similar downward trends in
other parts of the nation."
True, but most likely not because of the
Three Strikes law.
In fact, the overall crime rate in California
and the US has been declining since 1990
-- four years before the Three Strikes law
was implemented. A statistical analysis of
crime indexes in the ten largest cities of
California, recently completed by the
Sentencing Project, indicates the Three
Strikes measure doesn't significantly
reduce serious or minor crime beyond the
already existing downward spiral. For
example, in 1995, murder rates declined
by 25 percent in New York City, which
had no Three Strikes law while in the
same year murder rates increased by 42
percent in Tennessee which has
implemented a three strikes measure
(source: Coratiors TaLay, 1996).
While crime in California did decrease by
41 percent (as opposed to the national
average decline of 22 percent) it's likely
California's increased reduction in crime is
a result of other factors such as changing
demographics, economic improvements,
and better policing methods. California's
economy has improved drastically since
the early 1990s and there are significantly
fewer young males in this state.
The Three Strikes measure has resulted in
prison overcrowding and wastes money
by giving males in their mid-30s and -40s
life sentences. The average third striker
enters prison at age 36 and will serve
about 21 years. The average cost of
incarcerating an inmate in California is
about $25,600 per year, a figure that
triples when an inmate becomes elderly
and requires more health care. When it
adds up, thats about $1.5 million to
incarcerate a third-strike prisoner for 25
years.
Prior to the Three Strikes law, more than
90 percent of all criminal cases were
resolved by plea bargains. Now many
second and third-strike candidates are not
plea-bargaining because they are facing
lengthy prison terms; many of these
defendants are opting for costly jury trials
that waste even more taxpayer money.
Perhaps the most egregious consequences
of this strict measure are the draconian
sentences that are given to many third-
strikers. One hapless victim of this harsh
law received a 25-year-to-life sentence for
stealing a package of meat worth $5.62.
Another man received a life term for
shoplifting a pack of cigarettes, and
another unlucky third-striker was given a
30-year-to-life sentence for stealing a
video recorder and a coin collection.
These examples of judicial absurdity are
not exceptions to the rule, many third-
strikers are serving life sentences because
they were convicted of petty offenses
punishable under the Three Strikes law.
The Eight Amendment explicitly bans the
use of cruel and unusual punishment and
requires the courts to dispense sentences
commensurate with each criminal
conviction. Judge Richard A. Paez, one of
the two judges who ruled that Leandro
Andrade's sentence was unconsitutional
wrote: "The harshness of the sentence
appears grossly disproportionate to the
gravity of the offense and the culpability
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of the offender." The court also noted
that kidnappers and murderers could
receive less time than Andrade, who had a
prior record of petty offenses.
Judge Joseph Sneed dissented and stated,
"We have before us the clearest indication
possible that severe, mandatory sentences
for recidivist offenders is the expressed
penal philosophy of the citizens of
California."
But while the three Strikes law was passed
by 71 percent of california voters, a recent
survey has indicated Californians are
unclear on the scope of the law. Though
93 percent of those surveyed agreed
people convicted of three violent or
serious felonies should be sentenced to
25-years-to-life, only 65 percent of those
surveyed believed that a person convicted
of three serious drug crimes should
receive a life sentence. Narrowing it down
further, 47 percent concurred that a
person who commits three serious
property crimes should be given a life
sentence and only 13 percent agreed that a
person convicted of three "less serious"
property crimes should receive a life
sentence.
Even though public support for this
stringent measure is steadily losing
ground, the proponents of this law
continue to fervently defend it. Secretary
of State Bill Jones, who initially sponsored
this measure, referred to the Ninth Circuit
court's decision as a "get-out-of-jail-free
card" that could potentially reverse
California's diminishing crime rate.
A spokeswoman for Attorney General Bill
Lockyer's office, which supported
Leandro Andrade's sentence, stated the
office may ask the Ninth Circuit court to
reconsider their decision. Although the
Supreme Court has not made any rulings
with respect to the Three Strikes measure,
four of the Justices indicated that they
were bothered by a "unique quirk" in the
strict law -- the law allows shoplifting,
which is a misdemeanor, to be raised
twice to a felony and then to a Three
Strike felony if the offender had a prior
conviction of petty theft. Under other
circumstances, a misdemeanor petty theft
results in a maximum sentence of one year
in a county jail, but as a felony third strike,
it yields a life sentence for each count with
each count served consecutively.
While it is apparent that there are violent,
predatory career criminals who should be
incarcerated for life, there is an
overwhelming amount of evidence
indicating there is major disparity within
this sentencing scheme. With judges and
district attorneys able to decide if prior
strikes are able to be nullified or if an
offender should be charged under the
three strikes law, there is discrepancy in
how the law is applied from court to court
and county to county.
Additionally, there is no evidence that
suggests this stern measure deters crime.
A study regarding the deterrent effects of
the Three Strikes law examined the crime
rates of three major cities in California in
1993, 1994, and 1995, and determined that
less than 11 percent of all felonies were
perpetrated by two or three-strike eligible
offenders. Further, many violent felonies
are committed by people who are under
the influence of drugs, alcohol, or rage.
These altered states of emotional and
mental consciousness will have a
detrimental effect on a person's
judgement and will most likely render the
deterrent effects of any fixed mandatory
sentencing law useless.
The financial impact of the Three Strikes
law is enormous. The 1996/1997
Governor's Budget proposed $3.4 million
to establish a judicial "Three Strikes relief
32
team" of retired judges to hear the
backlog of cases. Los Angeles submitted a
test claim with the Commission on State
Mandates, seeking reimbursement of $169
million from the state for the costs of
Three Strikes to the county in 1994/1995
and 1995/1996. These expenditures are
just a fraction of the total annual cost of
this measure and only pertain to the first
three years in which the law was
implemented. The cost of incarcerating
non-violent felons for life is clearly much
more.
The taxpayer money that is spent on the
Three Strikes measure and the
construction of new prisons could be
diverted to California's educational
system. A Correctional Officer employed
within the California Department of
Corrections receives a significantly higher
annual income than the average teacher in
California. Philip Zimbardo, an eminent
social psychologist, asserts that education
is our "best insurance against crime" and
he makes reference to the fact that, for the
first time in history, the state budget for
corrections has just equaled that for
higher education and will soon surpass it.
Copyright @ 2002 frictionmagazine.com
and/or Charles Fannan
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This month we saw the introduction of a
legislative bill and a state initiative to
change California's "Three Strikes" law. It
is puzzling why anyone would want to
change a law that has been so graphically
effective in stopping crime. Still, there
remains a determined few who have and
will continue to do everything in their
power to undo the very tool that has
improved the quality of life for us all.
After Sept. 11, our political leaders spoke
of our government's primary directive "to
protect our citizens from all enemies, both
foreign and domestic," and to do
everything possible to create an
atmosphere that was conducive for
children to learn, for families to live and
for business to grow. This must first and
foremost be an atmosphere free from
fear.
When there is fear on our streets --
children can't learn, families won't stay,
and stores won't remain open when they
are being robbed every night.
Simple reasoning
Those who question Three Strikes ask not
that it be abolished but ask only for a few
changes to make it more "fair."
"Let's make all three of the strikes violent
as do other states and the federal
government," they say.
Well, nearly eight years have passed since
Three Strikes was enacted, so let's look at
other states and their Three Strikes laws
and compare them with California's law.
While it's clear to almost everyone that a
person with three violent prior
convictions should be locked up, how
many actually have been incarcerated in
other states under their various laws? The
answer is only a handful. Also noteworthy
is that those states have not seen any
greater drop in crime than states without
Three Strikes laws. There is a simple
explanation.
When we drafted Three Strikes, our first
idea was to make violent felonies
necessary on all three strikes. But in our
research, we found California had passed
such a law in 1982 and called it the
habitual felon law. The question was,
"Why was it not working?" The California
Department of Justice did a search on its
use and found that only 41 criminals had
been incarcerated in 10 years under the
habitual felon law. That is only 4.1
criminals per year in a state with 33
million people, not what one would call
taking a bite out of crime.
We were torn between making a law that
was "politically correct" and one that
would actually make our streets safer. We
knew that if we made all Three Strikes
violent, with no other mandatory
conditions, we wouldn't have any greater
effect on the crime rate than did the 1982
habitual felon law.
Of course, if nobody was being locked up,
then no one would complain and we
could have passed Three Strikes very
easily. But this law was never about
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understanding criminals; it has always
been about stopping them.
Earning strikes
Criminals, their attorneys and their
families want to change Three Strikes. But
it is important to remember that these
people got to prison under Three Strikes
the old fashioned way- They earned it.
That is how the Three Strikes law works.
You have to earn those strikes, nobody is
going to just give them to you. When we
start making laws that criminals, defense
attorneys, newspaper editors and bleeding
heart politicians approve of, well, that's
how we got in this mess to begin with.
California crime rates have dropped at
twice the national average since Three
Strikes was enacted. Note also that
California prison populations have
dropped since the passage of Three
Strikes.
Ten years before Three Strikes, California
added 19 new prisons. Now, nearly 10
years after Three Strikes, California will be
closing five prisons.
Three Strikes gives criminals three clear
choices: Leave California; get their lives
together and stop doing crime; or go to
prison. A testimony to the effectiveness of
Three Strikes is that the most-asked
question on our Web site is, "What states
don't have Three Strikes laws?"
When we have a law that saves lives and
taxpayer money, we have a winner.
Copyright a 2002 McClatchy
Newspapers, Inc., The Fresno Bee
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